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 Imagined Communities, Tangible Limits: Sendero Luminoso and the Incongruity of 
Marxism and Nationalism 
 To wax poetic, the divide between Marxist and nationalist movements can be 
characterized as a set of limits in which groups can either shoot or starve. In answering the 
question what does one stand for? these limits can be crucial in determining the political 
consciousness of a movement and its success in creating a shared revolutionary identity for a 
nation during a violent struggle or even a democratic transition. The proliferation of Marxist 
insurgencies in Latin America throughout the twentieth century highlights an ongoing 
reassessment of Marxist ideology and its connection to nationalism. Karl Marx and Friedrich 
Engels proposed nationalism not as a historical identity, but as a product of an economic “base.” 
The base, or means of production, influences the superstructure, which is largely a collection of 
all things not related to production in society. To Marx, nationalism and identity were derivatives 
of a society’s means and shape of production, which were controlled by the ruling class. Marx’s 
proletariat was working towards an eventual recognition and rejection of exploitation employed 
by the economic base and superstructure.1 This understanding failed to acknowledge the 
emotional and political nuance of nationalism and ultimately was dismissed by most scholars as 
an inadequate explanation of nationalism and nationalist movements.2  However, the emergence 
of such groups as Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, has raised further questions with regard to 
the use of Marxism as a means to achieve a national unified consciousness.    
 Shining Path is a Marxist-Maoist guerrilla insurgency, mainly active for much of the 
1980s and early 1990s, whose aim is to create a dictatorship of the proletariat by inducing a 
cultural revolution. At the heart of Shining Path’s campaign and, for that matter, Peru’s history, 
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rests a desire to balance the country’s traditional indigenous past with the possibility of 
modernity.3 With this in mind, a question arises regarding Shining Path’s connection with an 
indigenous Peruvian identity and its ultimate goal. Like the Chechen conflict’s adoption of 
Islam, can Marxism be seen as a reactionary vehicle because of past failings of national 
assertion, or did the Shining Path vision co-opt an indigenous identity to facilitate a macro-
revisionist framework? In other words, does the underlying theory of Marxism exclude the 
limitations that an inherently nationalist movement implies? In his famous exegesis, Benedict 
Anderson describes nationalism as a social construction moving through time and prompted by 
the emergence of print technology, capitalism, and the diversity of human language.4 Unlike the 
ideology of Marxism, Anderson explains nationalism in strictly constrained terms: “The nation is 
imagined as limited because even the largest of them, encompassing perhaps a billion living 
human beings, has finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. No nation 
imagines itself coterminous with mankind.”5  
 Anderson describes the fundamental problem with classifying Marxist groups, such as 
Shining Path, in nationalist terms. The underlying framework of Marxism and, as this paper will 
later demonstrate, the networks constructed by groups like Shining Path, promote a goal that 
transcends the limits that nationalism possesses. Although Shining Path began its Marxist epoch 
in the hopes of assuming an inherently Peruvian version of socialism through an indigenous 
identity, the ultimate goal of the movement was to inspire a worldwide revision of order and to 
disrupt a capitalist agenda by awakening various underclasses.6  Anderson’s elements of print 
technology and language, and their fundamental role in establishing a coherently unified 
understanding of nation can be applied as well. Cultural signifiers, such as language, Marxist 
literature, and indigenous cultural symbols (e.g. dress, historical actors, and language) can be 
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seen as restricted from alternating national narratives. Cultural symbols, like those used by 
indigenous movements in neighboring Bolivia, where groups had obtained more success in the 
political system, were appropriated by the state and mestizo elites in Peru, causing the latter 
movements to reject the usage of such symbols.7 Moreover, neoliberal economic conditions 
accompanying the end of the Cold War and the election of Alberto Fujimori, who embraced 
indigenism as a platform, in the early 1990s, weakened the appeal of a community-based 
consciousness in favor of discourse grounded in an individualist work ethic.8 However, this is 
not to say that ethnic indigenous mobilization was successful after the Cold War. The 1990s saw 
the recentralization of Peruvian politics wherein Fujimori was able to stifle any sort of collective 
action, labeling it “terrorism” in light of Peru’s continued struggle against Shining Path.9 This 
recentralization, along with the continued conflict between Shining Path and the State, caused an 
increased suppression of indigenous movements mainly because they were subject to harsher 
treatment from both sides of the conflict. Thus, Peru’s indigenous communities were unable to 
form a coherent national consciousness and Shining Path’s attempt to culturally erase an Indian 
identity from Peru’s peasant community failed to take root.10 Before analyzing the Sendero 
framework and its attempt to instill an indigenous, albeit Marxist narrative, however, Peru’s 
history must be explained in order to understand the factors that shaped nationalism and gave 
rise to an insurgency of such magnitude. 
Modern Missteps: Setting the Stage for Sendero 
 Shining Path can be seen as one of the most successful insurgencies in the Western 
Hemisphere during the late twentieth century. What is more, the group experienced remarkable 
success at a time when most Marxist-based movements throughout the world were dissolving.11  
Although the group’s framework relied primarily on Marxist philosophy stemming from José 
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Carlos Mariátegui, an early 20th century Peruvian socialist thinker and founder of the Peruvian 
Communist Party (PCP), Shining Path also employed a Maoist theory. Its general vision was to 
“destroy the old foreign-dominated political system in Peru, to take power, and to create a 
‘nationalistic,’ ‘Indian,’ and ‘popular’ democracy.”12  This vision could best be understood by an 
initial examination of Peru’s political history. 
 The legacy of Peru’s conflict can be seen in the country’s extreme diversity and its 
inability to democratize.13 With the former, the colonial founding of the country constructed a 
divide between indigenous and ethnically European Peruvians. Moreover, the geographic layout 
of the country, consisting of the Sierra, Costa, and Montaña regions, contained unequal 
concentrations of ethnic groups, which exacerbated this divide.14 As Orin Starn explains, 
Ayacuchan society in the mid-twentieth century remained haunted by the hierarchy of race and 
class that was a legacy of colonialism. Landowners and clerics from old families ruled regional 
life, while Quechua villagers battled against political disenfranchisement and want.15  Since 
Lima, the country’s capital, is in the Costa, which housed wealthy landowners (usually of 
European descent), a large portion of the population, mainly poor Quechua-speaking Indians 
living elsewhere, were excluded from the political system.16 Furthermore, the uneven 
geographical concentration of ethnic control gave rise to a dominant national narrative deriving 
from Spanish colonialism. This led to the racialization of national space and entrenched the 
Eurocentric narrative of “civilization” as the starting point of Peruvian nationhood.17 This is 
clearly demonstrated in terms of linguistics; as we will see, a mass education program by the 
state maintained a Eurocentric nationalist narrative by excluding Quechua, an indigenous 
language, from curriculums and was only attempted, albeit unsuccessfully, by the Velasco 
junta’s inclusion reforms.18     
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 With regard to its history of unstable democracy, Peru can historically be seen as a 
country ruled, for the most part, by dictatorships throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries.19 As Julio Carrión and David Scott Palmer point out, “Since Peru’s independence in 
1821, authoritarian regimes of one stripe or another have dominated the political landscape. 
There have been only brief interludes of elected civilian rule.”  After the country was able to 
solidify its territory, a period of limited civilian democracy took place from 1895-1919. During 
this period however, the first two executives, Augusto B. Leguía and Guillermo Billinghurst, 
controlled in personalistic ways, which involved systematic clientelism and fiscal corruption. 
This self-serving leadership resulted in Leguía being questionably re-elected in 1919. In order to 
consolidate his power, Leguía successfully led his own coup and he authoritatively ruled until a 
military takeover in 1930.20  
 With the advent of military rule in 1930, Peruvian politics adopted populism as a main 
method to establish efficiency and allocate political power to the elite classes of society. This 
worked up until the formation of the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Peru’s 
first mass-based political party.21 As the elites had no equivalent party to combat the non-elite 
presence, the military was required to fill the political vacuum through the use of veto coups to 
keep APRA out of power.22 Military populism, as a means to discourage party politics, was a 
significant factor in Peru’s inability to consolidate a stable democracy.23 In terms of national 
identity, APRA supported the ideology of mestizaje, which sought to include Andean culture as 
well as criollo, or European origins, into the public national narrative.24  APRA’s role as the 
powerless opposition is significant in that it highlights the fragmentation of national identity 
within Peruvian society; a stable political program of inclusion was unable to form without the 
help of the party.  
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 The APRA can best be seen as a precursor to the emergence of the Shining Path to the 
extent that it was a force of reform within Peruvian politics. Its widespread appeal disallowed the 
emergence of more radical movements and its favoritism towards land redistribution appealed to 
indigenous communities.25  At the same time as APRA was embedding itself within the political 
realm however, Peru continued to face disastrous economic conditions, especially in the 
indigenous-populated regions of the country.26 This factor is what ultimately facilitated the rise 
of Shining Path as a means to revise Peru’s legacy of unstable politics.27 
 Despite Shining Path’s vision of reestablishing an indigenous tradition, its formation 
began in middle-class universities. Most notably, the Universidad Nacional San Cristobal De 
Huamanga (UNSCH) became the nucleus of a resurgence of Marxist, and mostly Maoist, 
politics. With this growing sentiment of Marxism within universities, the border between 
scholarship and politics dissolved and campuses became sites of incessant political strikes. It was 
with this increasing campus action, that Abimael Guzmán, a UNSCH professor of philosophy 
and PCP party member, led the splinter movement that would ultimately form the Shining Path.28  
 In addition to the Marxist renaissance within the country’s universities, the new military-
backed president, Fernando Belaúnde Terry, and the Popular Action Party (PAP), took office in 
1962.29 Belaúnde’s incompetence led to unpopular decisions, increasing inflation, and high 
unemployment and a military-led “revolutionary junta” replaced him in 1968.30 Under the junta, 
employment opportunities, which were predicated on foreign-owned businesses, were scarce, 
and often only available to educated individuals of Spanish descent. Due to the foreign 
ownership of much of Peru’s businesses, revenue from labor reforms never materialized. The 
economy was also centralized in the coastal urban centers, leaving the Montaña-dwelling 
“Indians” few options for safe work, which inspired Marxist sentiment.31 In the beginning of the 
6
International Social Science Review, Vol. 91 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 4
http://digitalcommons.northgeorgia.edu/issr/vol91/iss1/4
1970s, the military junta began key reforms that, at first, seemed to curtail some of Belaúnde’s 
blunders. The junta’s reforms were also an attempt to include public national discourse into 
Peruvian society. From 1969 till 1980, an agrarian-reform program took place that appropriated 
land to about 360,000 farm families. Moreover, the new Peruvian government sought to diversify 
its external relationships in an attempt to decrease its economic and political dependency. In this 
model of corporatism, it was apparently assumed that the old party-based model would be 
replaced through an intense increase in the size and capacity of government and the incentives 
provided to popular sectors to relate to it.32   
 This, however, turned out to be false for four reasons. First and foremost, the military’s 
actions were too ambitious. Second, the success sought by the military was premised on 
continued economic growth, which dissipated in 1974 as economic difficulties increased. Since 
locally obtained resources were no longer available (due to the expropriation of private 
resources, which discouraged foreign direct investment), the government utilized short-term 
foreign loans that produced a severe debt crisis by 1978. Third, the top-down government 
management failed to include the perspective of the public; members of the peripheral 
indigenous communities rejected the “top-down” approach to include a public national narrative 
into the political discourse. This institutional gap contributed to public mistrust of the junta. Last, 
the deteriorating health of the junta’s leader, General Juan Velasco Alvarado, created further 
gaps within the government that contributed to confusing and ill-financed policy programs.33   
 An important detail gleaned from the attempted inclusion programs orchestrated by the 
junta however, is the fact that national identity and the incorporation of a narrative rooted in 
indigenous heritage were framed in economic terms.34 Peruvian Indians were categorized as 
“peasants” instead of “ethnic Indians” and public nationalism sought to depict laborers as 
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genuine national heroes. This was also the case in the Shining Path’s attempt to recruit Indian 
communities into the insurgency; the group ignored hierarchies and traditional methods of 
communitarian power and instead replaced them with Sendero ideology.  Instead of resisting and 
risking the possibility of violent retaliation on the part of the insurgency, many communities 
adapted to the new ways of life, but did not fully support Shining Path’s vision of Peruvian 
peasant nationalism.35 Peru, by the late 1970s, was in economic shambles. With the failure of the 
military junta, the country returned to civilian rule by 1980, but in an act of irony only suitable 
for Peruvian politics, the public re-elected Belaúnde, the man responsible for much of Peru’s 
mishaps in the past.36 With this, the Shining Path, which was dormant for much of the 1970s, 
committed what is largely seen as its first act of war in May 1980, when on election night they 
burned ballot boxes in Chuschi. After Chuschi, the group then advanced their “People’s War” 
through the Ayacucho region, razing government infrastructure and infiltrating indigenous 
villages.37 
 For the first three years of his presidency, Belaúnde ignored the threat of the group. It 
was not until 1982 that Ayacucho was declared an emergency zone and the administration 
yielded power to the military to combat the Shining Path.38 By the end of Belaúnde’s term, 
thousands had died in the violence, human rights abuses had skyrocketed, and property damage 
tallied over one billion dollars U.S.39 With the advent of the 1985 elections, Alán García entered 
office and, until 1987, Peru enjoyed a brief period of economic growth. The return to decline was 
due to a failed bank nationalization attempt and a suspension of all foreign debt payments, which 
by 1990 introduced hyperinflation at a staggering 7,650 percent.  Moreover, political violence, 
which was somewhat contained during the short period of growth, returned at an astounding rate. 
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Shining Path had been able to stifle many elections by assassinating candidates, or simply 
intimidating them into hiding.40  
 With Peru in a renewed state of unmitigated disaster, García was ousted from office in 
the 1990 elections. Peru suffered from drastic hyperinflation while the Shining Path numbered 
around 25,000 militants and controlled approximately a quarter of Peru’s municipalities. 
Nevertheless, few were prepared for what lied ahead for the Peruvian people. In what is 
described as a reaction to the usual state of Peruvian politics, Alberto Fujimori was elected 
president. It is important to note that Fujimori’s election campaign relied on a specific populist 
message that celebrated Peru’s indigenous past and heritage. In honoring his peasant upbringing, 
Fujimori gained the indigenous vote. In spite of his populist campaigning however, a series of 
neoliberal austerity measures (colloquially known as “Fujishock”) shortly followed to reign in 
Peru’s economic ailments. These measures proved useful and can be seen as why the 
government, as well as the people, permitted Fujimori’s autogolpe, or self-coup of 199241; 
during which, he dissolved Peru’s congress and judiciary in order to consolidate power and fully 
remove the Senderista insurgency and introduce a series of neoliberal reforms. Aside from the 
utility of Fujimori’s neoliberal economic policy, his election can be seen as a choice for Peruvian 
peasants between the Marxist ideology of Shining Path and neoliberalism. The economic disaster 
of the late 1980s brought hyperinflation and a ballooning deficit; the fear of Shining Path’s 
violence came second to economic survival.42   
 Before the autogolpe, Fujimori ignored Shining Path in order to tackle the country’s 
economic mishaps – similar to García’s government. With Fujishock, Peru enjoyed a period of 
economic stability thanks to Fujimori’s adherence to International Monetary Fund (IMF) debt 
restrictions, which renewed a U.S. presence in Peru. This reemergence of a “Yankee” presence 
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caused Sendero violence to escalate.43 Nonetheless, Fujimori’s autogolpe responded to the 
problem of Shining Path by learning from the mistakes of his predecessors. Much of the problem 
with previous administrations’ methods of combatting the Shining Path stemmed from the 
institutional divide between the military and the government.44 Unlike Belaúnde and García, 
Fujimori gained control and dominated military leaders charged with rooting out the insurgency. 
Reckless generals were asked to retire and loyalists were placed in power positions. Moreover, a 
series of laws were passed that allowed suspected insurgents to be imprisoned for up to fifteen 
days without charge and anonymity for judges trying cases related to the Shining Path. These 
measures demonstrated the full effect of the autogolpe and Peru became the first Latin American 
state of the 1990s to reenter authoritarianism.45 Although there is a debate regarding the 
proliferation of human rights abuses during the autogulpe and whether or not Fujimori was 
warranted in his consolidation of executive power, it did produce results in fighting the Shining 
Path. On September 12, 1992, Fujimori’s National Directorate Against Terrorism (DIRCOTE) 
captured Guzmán and the repercussions were monumental: Guzmán’s capture was the turning 
point in the fight against Sendero Luminoso as Guzmán was Shining Path. He had killed or 
discredited any who had grown too strong and the cronies who remained were left in charge and 
forced to take the group into the future. Due to Sendero’s compartmentalized structure, many of 
these subordinate leaders did not even know each other. Undoubtedly, Guzmán’s fall left the 
Shining Power with a great power vacuum and severely limited.46   
 After Guzmán’s capture, violence significantly decreased in Peru and Fujimori’s 
approval rating increased to 73 percent. The influence of Guzmán speaks volumes on the cultural 
identification and efficacy of the movement. The Shining Path, which controlled major portions 
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of Peru and nearly toppled the government, became reduced to insignificant in the span of a 
year.47 
Why Not Nationalism?: Limits and Language 
 The actions of Peru’s government created an institutional vacuum within indigenous 
communities. Peru wrestled with competing national identities long before the 1980s, but the 
Shining Path acknowledged this struggle and capitalized from it. This fragmented vision of 
nationalism contributed to what Itzigsohn and vom Hau describe as a blocked transformation in 
Peru’s trajectory of nationalism throughout the 20th century. Because of Peru’s historical 
consolidation of power in the coastal sector of the country and the government’s limited spatial 
capacity in the typically indigenous Montaña and Sierra, the official national ideology was 
rooted in a Eurocentric identity.48  Moreover, José Itzigsohn and Matthias vom Hau explain the 
role of “subordinate groups” in either becoming included or restricted by state elites. Peru’s 
contest to incorporate various national narratives in its political discourse can be seen as a 
competition between state elites (e.g. government and regional elites) and subordinate groups 
(e.g. Labor movements, APRA, and Indian communities). This competition racialized space (i.e. 
the Costa became identified with criollo heritage) and disallowed an indigenous identity to be 
included in the hegemonic Peruvian narrative.49  
 It is in this context that the status of Shining Path as a nationalist group can be discussed. 
When one considers the advent of the Shining Path in conjunction with Peru’s legacy of a 
blocked transformation, the insurgency, although not a form of state power, cannot be 
categorized as a “subordinate group.” Instead, Shining Path’s vision of Marxism as a signifier of 
an indigenous Peruvian identity can be seen as an answer to the problem of nationalism that 
Indian communities rejected. Shining Path’s nonindigenous intellectual mestizo class attempted 
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to connect itself to the subordinate indigenous groups in the countryside and facilitate its vision 
of a Maoist-Marxist revolution. Further, the election of Fujimori and his autogolpe precluded the 
organization of indigenous movements and the possibility for them to introduce a national 
narrative rooted in an Indian-peasant identity.50  Likewise, APRA’s mass-based appeal, which 
allowed for a national discourse grounded in an indigenous consciousness to enter the political 
system and Velasco’s land redistribution reforms attempted to incorporate the identity of 
indigenous populations into the public ideology of Peruvian nationalism.51 The legacy of Shining 
Path could even be seen as having a counteractive effect on the inclusion of the Indian-peasant 
population. Since the insurgency chose to disconnect mountain and countryside communities 
from their relationship to government, the state elites continued to conduct relations with the 
regional elites of indigenous communities.  
 The underlying framework of the Shining Path additionally implied that a worldwide 
revision is necessary after Peru succumbed to a Marxist revolution. As Benedict Anderson 
suggests, the imagining of a nation as limited disrupts this framework and excludes it from a 
nationalist agenda.52 The Sendero identity of a Latin American “Indian” uprising failed to 
contain a strictly Peruvian identity. Instead, it disregarded nationalist sentiment and ignored the 
historical basis of such stratification. Indigenous identification has also sometimes been confined 
to participation within a Peruvian society. As María Elena García points out, Quechua instruction 
is discouraged by many Indian communities due to its practical limitations in regards to social 
mobility and career opportunity.53  This ignorance on the part of the Shining Path is perhaps the 
most damning trait in regards to its connection with nationalism. As a means to fulfill its vision, 
the Shining Path co-opted a Peruvian indigenous identity via intimidation, murder, and extortion. 
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The public rejection of Guzmán’s vision is evident in Fujimori’s popularity during the time of 
his autogulpe. 
 In addition to exploring the fragmentation of Peruvian national identities and 
nationalism’s inherent limitedness, there is also merit in discussing Anderson’s elements of print 
technology and language as social instigators of a nationalist identity in a contemporary sense. 
Most notably, the emergence of Marxist inspired literature and literary movements highlight the 
beginnings of Peru’s descent into instability due to the Sendero insurgency, but also convey a 
telling shift in the development of a public national identity. Anderson looks to print literature as 
a main factor in developing a coherent horizontal sense of membership in the national sense. 
Instead of maintaining Latin, or another elite language of antiquity, the print industry sought to 
incorporate mass vernacular into books (e.g. English and German) to access the largest consumer 
population. However, there had to be some line drawing in terms of accessible language; all 
spoken regional dialects were too numerous to be included. In short, print languages developed 
due to the industry’s need for a large customer population and the restrictions that technology 
provided. After print languages became popularized and education reforms began to take place, 
allowing more people to gain access to reading and writing, Anderson argues that a sense of 
national community based on language formed.54  
 During the Velasco-initiated mass inclusion program, APRA and the mestizaje ideology 
gathered traction in the form of a public education initiative. From 1955 till 1968, the number of 
universities in Peru quintupled from six to thirty.55  Moreover, education reforms occurred at the 
primary and secondary levels and attempted to incorporate large portions of Indian communities 
into Peruvian national life. Highland populations viewed education as a means to elevate 
themselves economically in a time of fiscal instability.56  With the reforms, a mass urbanization, 
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also known as “choloization” period occurred during which many highland-dwelling Indian 
communities became mixed in with the Eurocentric city life.57  It is perhaps important to restate 
that many of these reforms however, framed indigenous nationalism in economic class terms (i.e. 
peasant-laborer). There was no difference with the education reforms; the program contained a 
uniform curriculum that ignored indigenous identity and maintained a Eurocentric coastal 
vision.58    
 As the birthplace of the Sendero ideology, Peru’s universities and the literature they 
produced can be examined alongside the geographical and ethnoracial divides that the country 
suffered. The contemporary discourse involving Peruvian nationalism and its attempted 
broadening was not only a state-backed endeavor; literary movements became a valid and 
thriving mechanism to instill social change at a time where Peru seemed to be undergoing a 
drastic shift.59  Most notably, the poetic underground Movimiento Hora Zero, a group of 
bohemian poets from highland universities, sought to influence Peru’s political, economic, and 
national ailments through literature. Hora Zero marked a deviation from Peru’s Eurocentric 
literary roots.60 Writers rejected classical Peruvian works and immersed themselves in “peasant” 
life; however this mainly took place in universities and urban centers.61 Moreover, they 
“cultivated a colloquial tone and language” in their writing, attempting to depict “everyday” Peru 
as opposed to Eurocentric urban traditions.62   Although Hora Zero included regional language 
and experiences in their writing, one can examine a by now familiar misstep in terms of their 
wish to incorporate a public national narrative into Peruvian society. Like Sendero ideology, 
APRA, and the Velasco junta, Hora Zero’s main focus, which was the case in Peru’s 
universities, was to form a public narrative of national identity predicated on class-
consciousness.   
14
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 The public discourse offered by movements such as Hora Zero and similar Marxist 
literature, although offering a new public narrative containing indigenous inclusion, succumbed 
to the ethnoracial cleavages that blocked previous attempts by APRA and the state. Given that 
the language of inclusion became couched in Marxist terms, which originated from university 
settings and art movements in cities, an imagined sense of community could not develop in 
accordance with Anderson’s theory. In a sense, the universities, APRA, and the state controlled 
the conversation on public national identity. Furthermore, as the political climate in Peru’s 
universities became more radicalized, ultimately leading to the formation of Shining Path, 
Guzmán and his colleagues were able to develop a band of supporters and institute Sendero 
ideology by force in highland communities that otherwise would not have adopted a Marxist 
narrative as a signifier for an indigenous consciousness. Educated underclass members, who 
were able to attend universities due to education reforms, became trained as teachers in the 
Marxist perspective and served as an effective way for Sendero ideology to infiltrate Indian 
villages.63 Moreover, the economic crisis of the late 1980s helps to explain the indigenous 
population’s support for Fujimori, the antithesis of Shining Path’s Marxist agenda. Prior to 
Fujimori taking office the center-left García administration instituted policies that focused on 
splintering Peru’s workforce. This caused leftist unions to address labor concerns of permanent 
employees, largely ignoring informal labor needs. With the highland communities making up 
most of the informal workforce, an emphasis of individualism appeared and translated into the 
political support for independent economically conservative candidates outside of APRA and 
other center-left parties, such as Fujimori. As mentioned earlier, the election of Alberto Fujimori, 
along with this more individualized identification, impeded indigenous collective action to 
construct an expansive national consciousness.64     
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 The development of public nationalism by APRA, the state, literary movements, and 
even the Shining Path shed light on the inability for an indigenous national identity to form. All 
of the activists and institutions that sought to change Peru’s national narrative did so without the 
perspective of indigenous communities. Many of the actors involved rejected a strictly 
indigenous mindset and opted for a diversification of Eurocentric and indigenous history, which 
arose from Peru’s cities and universities and were implemented by the Velasco junta.65  
Moreover, the emphasis on class structure and Indian communities as labor heroes of Peru 
coincide with the importance of Anderson’s language contention in that it framed Spanish, as 
opposed to Quechua, as an economic benefit to the indigenous “peasants.” As stated previously, 
Peruvian Quechuas liken the signifiers of Lima’s citizenship to economic advancement and the 
elevation of one’s social status.66  Likewise, Anderson notes that dying for one’s country evokes 
a heightened sense of dignity than it perhaps would for the labor party (or even Shining Path).67  
This poses an additional question that demonstrates the inherent shortcomings of Shining Path’s 
nationalist framework: If Shining Path sought to empower indigenous Peruvians and the 
revolution was to fully realize an Indian nation, why did indigenous groups refuse to fight and 
die for the movement? To answer this, Anderson looks again to language in two ways. First, 
language’s inherent “primordialness” exhibits a bond that extends any of contemporary society’s 
roots. Language, Anderson posits, has no starting or ending point. One’s spoken language is 
simply “there” and cannot be traced back to a particular origin. Further, language is the most 
effective means of connecting society to the dead via the shared understanding that certain 
meanings connected with death transcend space and time to evoke a similar feeling.68   
 Second, Anderson looks to what he phrases as the “unisonance” language conjures. 
Complete strangers have the ability to actualize the imagined community through a simultaneous 
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practice of a shared language. National anthems and similar poetry allow the individual to gain 
cognizance of the fact that he or she is singing at the precise moment of his or her national 
counterparts and nothing connects them but “imagined sound.”69  In this, the absence of a 
national “feeling” can be seen in the Peruvian state and Shining Path’s categorization of 
indigenous ethnicity and nationality in Marxist terms. This feeling is exemplified through 
Anderson’s writing: “What the eye is to the lover – that particular, ordinary eye he or she is born 
with – language – whatever language history has made his or her mother-tongue – is to the 
patriot.”70  Spanish, as a top-down mechanism to elevate one economically, was never seen in 
the same primordial sense as say, Quechua. Thus, histories and futures dreamed were never able 
to take root in the imagined sense and create the “nationalness” that which Anderson describes.  
In dealing with the case of Peruvian nationalism and the advent of the Shining Path, the question 
of nationalism seems to be answered in the underlying framework of the insurgency as well as its 
expansive agenda to unite a pan-indigenous community within Latin America. Anderson 
questions the anomaly that is Marx’s explanation of nationalism within the Manifesto, “The 
proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle matters with its own bourgeoisie.”71  
The Sendero framework, like that of Marx or the case of Russified states of the Cold War, fails 
to answer Anderson’s question to Marx’s above statement: Why is this segmentation of the 
proletariat significant?72  As one can see from the trajectory of Sendero’s actions as well as the 
phenomenon of Peruvian nationalism, the insurgency was confined to the limits that Marx 
determined in his inability to decipher the anomaly of nationalism within his theory and 
conceptualize national identity as a historical experience. Moreover, the primordial element of 
language and print in Peru exemplify the dissonance that engulfed the actors tasked with 
introducing a public national narrative into society. Without a coherent narrative based on ethnic 
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and linguistic signifiers, indigenous communities were unwilling to adhere to the imposed 
identity framed in labor-based political rhetoric. The imagined community rooted in language 
could never form within the social and physical cleavages planted in Peru’s history. In addition, 
the economic missteps of Peru’s government from the 1970s through the 1980s facilitated a 
political environment wherein neoliberal reforms could take place, which ultimately stifled any 
meaningful opportunities for collective action within Peru’s indigenous communities. The 
reforms of Fujimori in terms of Peruvian labor for highland communities strengthened a more 
individualist political consciousness, which became prevalent during the country’s choloization 
period. Thus, the Shining Path insurgency and its use of force ultimately failed like that of 
Velasco and APRA’s endeavor to institute a mestizaje ideology, and with such failure, the 
imagined communities of indigenous Peruvians lacked the feeling to shoot or starve for 
Marxism. Instead, they sacrificed not by choice, but at the whim of the insurgency.  
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